Reactions and explanations South Thailand insurgency

1 reactions , explanations

1.1 official reactions
1.2 islam
1.3 political factors
1.4 economic factors
1.5 public opinion

reactions , explanations
official reactions

the government @ first blamed attacks on bandits , , many outside observers believe local clan, commercial or criminal rivalries played role in violence.

in 2002, thaksin stated, there s no separatism, no ideological terrorists, common bandits. 2004, however, had reversed position , had come regard insurgency local front in global war on terrorism. martial law instituted in pattani, yala, , narathiwat in january 2004.

since 2006 military coup, thai government has taken more conciliatory approach insurgency, avoiding excessive use of force typified thaksin s time in office, , opened negotiations known separatist groups. violence, however, has escalated. backs assertion there several groups involved in violence, few of whom have been placated government s change of strategy.

on 3 june 2011, army chief prayut chan-o-cha stated insurgency orchestrated abroad , funded via drug , oil smuggling.

islam

anonymous leaflets issued militant groups contain jihadist language. many young militants received training , indoctrination islamic teachers, of took place within islamic educational institutions. many [who?] see southern thai violence form of islamist militancy , islamic separatism, testifying strength of malay muslim beliefs , determination of local people resist (buddhist) thai state on religious grounds.

political factors

thai authorities claim insurgency not caused lack of political representation of muslim population. late 1990s, muslims holding unprecedented senior posts in thai politics. example, wan muhamad noor matha, malay muslim yala, served chairman of parliament 1996 2001 under democrats , later interior minister during first thaksin government. thaksin s first government (2001–2005) saw 14 muslim members of parliament (mps) , several muslim senators. muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies in border provinces, , several southern municipalities had muslim mayors. muslims able voice political grievances openly , enjoy greater degree of religious freedom.

the thaksin regime, however, began dismantle southern administration organisation, replacing notoriously corrupt police force began widespread crackdowns. consultation local community leaders abolished. discontent on abuses led growing violence during 2004 , 2005. muslim politicians , leaders remained silent out of fear of repression, eroding political legitimacy , support. cost them dearly. in 2005 general election, 1 of eleven incumbent muslim mps stood election voted out of office.

economic factors

poverty , economic problems have been cited factor behind insurgency. however, performance of deep south s economy improved markedly in past few decades. between 1983 , 2003, average per capita income of pattani grew 9,340 baht 57,621 baht, while of yala , narathiwat increased 14,987 baht , 10,340 baht 52,737 baht , 38,553 baht, respectively. impressive these gains are, border provinces did have lowest average income among southern provinces. also, national average below estimated average needed considered acceptable minimum wage international organisations southeast asia. 1 argue average per capita income in southernmost provinces 20-25% of thai minimum wage be.

household income improved 2002 2004 21.99%, 19.27%, , 21.28% pattani, yala, , narathiwat, respectively. comparison, income growth of thailand in same period 9.4%.

the percentage of people living below poverty line fell, 40%, 36%, , 33% in 2000 18%, 10%, , 23% in 2004 pattani, narathiwat, , yala, respectively. 2004, 3 provinces had 310,000 people living below poverty line, compared 610,000 in 2000. however, 45% of poor southerners lived in 3 border provinces.

muslims in border provinces have lower levels of educational attainment compared buddhist neighbours. 69.80% of muslim population in border provinces have primary school education, compared 49.6% of buddhists in same provinces. 9.20% of muslims have completed secondary education (including graduated private islamic schools), compared 13.20% of buddhists. 1.70% of muslim population have bachelor s degree, while 9.70% of buddhists hold undergraduate degrees. government schools taught in thai , secular educational system being undermined destruction of schools , murders of teachers insurgent groups.

the lesser educated muslims have reduced employment opportunities compared buddhist neighbours. 2.4% of working muslims in provinces held government posts, compared 19.2% of working buddhists. jobs in thai public sector difficult obtain muslims never accepted thai language or thai education system. insurgent attacks on economic targets further reduce employment opportunities both muslims , buddhists in provinces.

public opinion

some locals in area support kind of independence thailand; others not. shown national referendum support junta-backed constitution thailand, favoured majority in 3 southernmost provinces , passed overwhelmingly in southern region of thailand, 87% of 3.7 million voters participated there approving it. furthermore, while in insurgent groups support armed conflict, southern residents seem want negotiation , compromise , rule of law return, along end human rights abuses both sides.