Congress of Deputies Politics of Spain

relation between number of people represented each deputee in each province , national average (june 2016 elections).

elections cortes generales held every 4 years or before if prime ministers calls election. members of congress of deputies elected through proportional representation closed party lists provinces serve electoral districts; is, list of deputies selected province-wide list. under current system, sparsely populated provinces overrepresented because more seats of representatives allocated sparsely populated provinces have if number of seats allocated strictly according population proportion.

not provinces small population over-represented in spain s election system, system tends favors major political parties. despite use of proportional representation voting system, in general encourages development of larger number of small political parties rather few larger ones, spain has two-party system in smaller , regional parties tend underrepresented. owing various reasons:

due great disparity in population among provinces, though smaller provinces overrepresented, total number of deputies assigned them still small , tends go 1 or 2 major parties, if other smaller parties managed obtain more 3% of votes - minimum threshold representation in congress.
the average district magnitude (the average number of seats per constituency) 1 of lowest in europe, owing large number of constituencies. low district magnitude tends increase number of wasted votes (the votes not affect election results because have been cast small parties not pass effective threshold), , in turn increase disproportionality (so number of seats , portion of votes got party becomes less proportional). regarded important factor limits number of parties in spain. point advanced when baldini , pappalardo compare case of netherlands, parliament elected using proportional representation in single national constituency. there, parliament more fragmented , number of parties higher in spain.
the d hondt method (a type of highest average method) used allocate seats, favors major parties when compared sainte-laguë method (another type of highest average method) or normal kinds of largest remainder methods. suggested use of d hondt method contribute degree, though not large low number of seats per constituency, bipolarization of party system.
the 3% threshold entering congress ineffective in many provinces, number of seats per constituency low actual threshold enter congress higher, , many parties cannot obtain representation in congress despite having obtained more 3% threshold in constituency. example, actual threshold constituencies having 3 seats 25%, higher 3%, making 3% threshold irrelevant. however, in largest constituencies madrid , barcelona, number of seats higher, 3% threshold still effective eliminate smallest parties.
the size of congress (350 members) relatively small. suggested lijphart small size of parliament may encourage disproportionality , favor large parties.




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