Analysis Ernest King

ernest king served 55 years on active duty in united states navy, 1 of longest careers on record service. king man have ever held posts of chief of naval operations , commander in chief, united states fleet simultaneously, making him 1 of powerful u.s. navy officers ever serve. naval officer, king highly intelligent , extremely capable, controversial , difficult serve with, over, or under. king s blunt honesty , short temper made him numerous enemies, leaving mixed legacy.

pointing king s five-and-a-half decades in navy , many accomplishments 1 of highest-ranked allied military leaders of world war ii, consider king 1 of greatest admirals of 20th century; others, however, point out never commanded ships or fleets @ sea in war time, , anglophobia led him make decisions cost many allied lives.

others see ability counter both british , u.s. army influence on american world war ii strategy indicative of strong leadership, , praise outspoken recognition of strategic importance of pacific war. instrumental role in decisive guadalcanal campaign has earned him admirers in united states , australia, , consider him organizational genius. demanding , authoritarian, , abrasive , abusive subordinates. king respected ability, not liked many of officers commanded.

john ray stakes described him as:

…perhaps disliked allied leader of world war ii. british field marshal montgomery may have had more enemies... king loved parties , drank excess. apparently, reserved charm wives of fellow naval officers. on job, seemed angry or annoyed.

there famous tongue-in-cheek remark king, made 1 of daughters , repeated navy personnel @ time, even-tempered person in united states navy. in rage. franklin d. roosevelt once described king man shaves every morning blow torch.

it commonly reported when king called cominch, remarked, when in trouble send sons-of-bitches. however, when later asked if had said this, king replied had not, have if had thought of it. on other hand, king s view of press relations navy in world war ii documented. when asked state public relations policy navy, king replied don t tell them anything. when s over, tell them won.

admiral king @ atlantic conference in 1941.


response operation drumbeat

at start of involvement in world war ii, blackouts on u.s. eastern seaboard not in effect, , commercial ships traveling coastal waterways not travelling under convoy. king s critics attribute delay in implementing these measures anglophobia, convoys , seaboard blackouts british proposals, , king supposedly loath have much-beloved u.s. navy adopt ideas royal navy. refused, until march 1942, loan of british convoy escorts when americans had handful of suitable vessels. was, however, aggressive in driving destroyer captains attack u-boats in defense of convoys , in planning counter-measures against german surface raiders, before formal declaration of war in december 1941.

instead of convoys, king had u.s. navy , u.s. coast guard perform regular anti-submarine patrols, these patrols followed regular schedule. u-boat commanders learned schedule, , coordinated attacks these schedules. leaving lights on in coastal towns back-lit merchant ships u-boats. result, there period of disastrous shipping losses—two million tons lost in january , february 1942 alone, , urgent pressure applied both sides of atlantic. however, king resisted use of convoys because convinced navy lacked sufficient escort vessels make them effective. formation of convoys inadequate escort result in increased port-to-port time, giving enemy concentrated groups of targets rather single ships proceeding independently. furthermore, blackouts politically sensitive issue—coastal cities resisted, citing loss of tourism revenue.

it not until may 1942 king marshalled resources—small cutters , private vessels had scorned—to establish day-and-night interlocking convoy system running newport, rhode island, key west, florida.

by august 1942, submarine threat shipping in u.s. coastal waters had been contained. u-boats second happy time ended, loss of 7 u-boats , dramatic reduction in shipping losses. same effect occurred when convoys extended caribbean. despite ultimate defeat of u-boat, of king s initial decisions in theatre viewed flawed.

in king s defense, noted naval historian professor robert w. love has stated that:

operation drumbeat (or paukenschlag) off atlantic coast in 1942 succeeded largely because u.s. navy committed other tasks: transatlantic escort-of-convoy operations, defending troop transports, , maintaining powerful, forward-deployed atlantic fleet striking forces prevent breakout of heavy german surface forces. navy leaders, admiral king, unwilling risk troop shipping provide escorts coastal merchant shipping. unscheduled, emergency deployments of army units created disruptions navy plans, did other occasional unexpected tasks. contrary traditional historiography, neither admiral king s unproven yet alleged anglophobia, equally undocumented navy reluctance accept british advice, nor preference strategy caused delay in inauguration of coastal escort-of-convoy operations. delay due shortage of escorts, , resulted understandably conflicting priorities, state of affairs dictated allied strategy until 1944.

context navy s , admiral king s response operation drumbeat

authority: admiral king assumed appointment cominch, fleet on december 20, 1941 admiral kimmel. while command provided operational control of 3 navy fleets , coastal vessels, admiral stark chief of naval operations included responsibilities under article 392 , article 433, navy regulations (“the chief of naval operations shall, under direction of secretary of navy, charged operations of fleet , preparation , readiness of plans use in war, act of 3 mar. 1915 ). admiral king not appointed dual role of chief of naval operations until issuance of general order no. 170, dated march 23, 1942.

availability of vessels (based on variety of sources): analysis of disposition of naval vessels in december, 1941 highlights total of 300 “patrol capable vessels” (dd, pg, pc, coast guard cutters, py , pyc types) including in overhauls, major repairs , fitting-out. inventory includes 171 destroyers of on 40% wwi era types, 52 “patrol types” (pg, py, pyc) including spanish american war trophies , collection of 76 coast guard cutters (not including 10 of 21 larger 250+’ cutters given british).

the atlantic fleet contained 100% of newer sims, benson , gleaves destroyer classes. of 91 destroyers deployed in atlantic fleet (leaving 66 in pacific , 13 in asiatic fleets), 52 atlantic fleet destroyers deployed either on atlantic convoy duty (including squadron escorting british troop transports around cape town), in iceland or newfoundland; 24 either in atlantic ports (including fitted-out, repairs) or serving capital ship escorts; 4 stationed in bermuda; , remaining 8 stationed @ canal zone working convoys or in port. atlantic fleet accounted 37 patrol type (leaving handful pacific , asiatic fleets) vessels 7 assigned caribbean , 54 of coast guard cutters 26 assigned greenland/newfoundland/iceland patrols.

if 1 looks @ building programs fy39 , fy40, navy had 194 destroyers (some ordered in june , july 1940), 140 patrol craft (pc s 173 , 165 , 110 ), 78 sub chasers (sc’s) , 129 yms’s (which utilized anti-sub role if necessary). of destroyers laid down in 1940-1 not commissioned on december 7, twenty-eight commissioned between january , june of 1942 16 assigned atlantic fleet or european theater of operations (eto) , 12 assigned pacific fleet (and of 12, 1/3 conducted anti-submarine/convoy duty in atlantic/caribbean prior reporting pacific fleet) and, of remaining fifty-two of classes of 1940-1, 35 commissioned , assigned atlantic fleet and/or eto.

as coastal class escorts, navy commissioned 126 vessels in period january june 1942 83 being assigned atlantic fleet. bulk of vessels of new 173’ pc , 110’ sc (some 110 pc reassigned sc types) classes. during same period, coast guard commissioned 11 vessels 10 being assigned greenland/newfoundland patrols. period july–december 1943, navy commissioned additional 52 patrol craft and, while data on 110’ sc’s little lacking, pattern seems remain bulk of vessels being assigned atlantic fleet while coast guard commissioned 21 vessels 19 going greenland/newfoundland patrols. in addition, number of other vessels types being launched configured escorts 7 cactus class lighthouse tenders in 1942 (as follow-on cactus , mesquite classes); admirable class minesweepers; , yms class minesweepers. coast guard drafted every vessel type including sea going tugs, weather ships, icebreakers, , converted freighters greenland patrol.

prior , during wwii, navy instituted procurement , modification of civilian/commercial vessels has in times of conflict since revolution. effort began in earnest efforts enforce neutrality patrols , continued past december 1941. in fact of “patrol” types available prior december 1941, majority of them acquired, converted craft (pg, py, pyc). navy extended acquisitions of fishing vessels fill mine-sweeping , harbor patrol duties (am, amc types). coast guard (under command of navy) continued acquire commercial , fishing vessel types patrol cutters (wpg, wyp, wypc, wak) stages of war 95% being utilized east coast majority assigned greenland patrol.

as escort carriers, 2 “escort carriers” (avg/cve types) following general design of uss long island (acquired march 1941) built prior december 1941 1 being siphoned-off uk. during first half of 1942, 4 cve’s commissioned 2 going uk other 2 being assigned navy 1 each pacific , atlantic. in last half of 1942, fifteen cve’s commissioned 6 going uk, , 1 of navy units assigned atlantic fleet. manned cve’s carried more robust air wing previous uk-built/manned vessels and, obviously, uk units not assigned daunting tasks facing navy.

availability of naval patrol aircraft (based on variety of sources): naval aviation, review of “dictionary american naval aviation squadrons” , declassified “location of u.s. naval aircraft” show on february 2, 1942 navy had 102 “primary” patrol aircraft (pby-5, pv-1, pb4y-1 (b-24), , pbm-3) deployed in 9 squadrons in atlantic fleet (gulf, caribbean , atlantic) including 33% of squadrons deployed newfoundland or iceland (and net of vp-72 , vp-71). navy had 110 aircraft (post losses japanese , asiatic fleet , inclusion of 2 transferred squadrons atlantic) in fourteen squadrons in greater pacific. of course, 1 can point transfer after pearl harbor of vp-72 , vp-71 atlantic bias, 1 must consider losses inflicted japanese. in addition, 51 shorter range in-shore patrol aircraft assigned atlantic fleet while 42 posted in pacific.

by june 25, 1942, navy had 168 “primary” patrol aircraft in “battle atlantic” zones in 15 squadrons while 176 aircraft (including remainder of asiatic squadrons) in greater pacific. navy assigned 148 in-shore patrol aircraft in atlantic fleet while 86 assigned in greater pacific. december 8, 1942, navy increased “primary” patrol aircraft 174 in atlantic net of 164 in pacific (net of headquarters , training commands , squadrons being trained). actually, atlantic fleet training commands conducted anti-submarine , convoy escort missions had more aircraft pacific units.

inter-service challenges: put forward in army antisubmarine command history, there “conflicts” between navy , army addressing defense seaborne treats along coasts. under joint action of army , navy (ftp-155, 1935), navy had responsibility seaborne coastal patrols , there no debate on navy operating seaplanes , carrier-class aircraft. general arnold opposed navy operating land-based bombers , admiral king’s request of 200 b-24’s , 400 b-25’s long range patrol. on army air forces side, little done provide necessary air assets when navy requested army air force (aaf) assign bomber command support atlantic fleet. command thrown gap stripped of of long-range aircraft. if fact january 1943, 2 aaf commands tasked support navy’s effort put 139 operational aircraft (given strains of build-up in eto).

staffing: navy had 160,000 personnel in 1940 building 640,570 plus 56,716 uscg in 1942 on 3.3 million end of war. in 1941 1942, meager availability of trained officers , ncos had metered out crews new capital ships, supply operations, medical operations, repair , maintenance operations, air wings, etc. patrol craft , destroyers assignments of challenging non-flight assignments given reliance on junior officers.

black-outs/dim-outs: there support admiral king’s reliance on fdr order blackouts/dim-outs along coasts. order have come fdr (as executive order); fdr have expedited request congress enact emergency legislation; or contacted governors of relevant states address situation.

threats in pacific: in first 6 months year of 1942, japanese have utilized 65 (63 ocean-going submarines) submarines conduct anti-shipping campaign either cut-off hawaii or australia/new zealand (remember, japanese subs present @ pearl harbor , sited in philippines) newly won bases.

there no statistical evidence admiral king stripped atlantic fleet fill gaps in pacific nor evidence navy had neglected preparation anti-submarine warfare or ignored learning wwi, neutrality patrols or battle of atlantic. attack on pearl harbor caught navy in stages of operationalization. 1 can praise navy ability implement convoys bevy of “green” crews, new vessels , new aircraft coming “on line.” if war had started 6 months later germans have been facing different navy.

a lesser leader have pointed intense commitment atlantic convoys system uk , russia; augment british home fleet; and/or support australia , new zealand (as british navy had) , have demanded relocation of experienced crews , vessels waters (as fought eliminate further lead-lease deployment of naval escort-grade vessels). admiral king stayed course , navy reasserted both in “battle of atlantic” and, no british, in string of great victories in pacific. bottom line if fdr thought admiral king incompetent admiral king have been fired.

other decisions

other decisions regarded questionable resistance employment of long-range usaaf b-24 liberator on atlantic maritime patrols (thus allowing u-boats safe area in middle of atlantic — atlantic gap )(see inter-service challenges fact of 13 pb4y naval aviation squadrons commissioned in 1943, 8 deployed atlantic fleet), denial of adequate numbers of landing craft allied invasion of europe (a broad assertion since war production in civilian hands , joint chiefs recommended president deployment priorities fact of added drain on landing craft caused battle of anzio), , reluctance permit royal navy s pacific fleet role in pacific (again, broad assertion has been treated in depth in variety of recent histories of war in pacific pointing complexities of integrating british naval force did not have adequate supply infrastructure nor proven ability operate navy s fast carrier groups). in of these instances, circumstances forced re-evaluation or overruled. has been pointed out king did not, in post-war report secretary of navy, accurately describe slowness of american response off-shore u-boat threat in 1942.

it should noted, however, employment of long-range maritime patrol aircraft in atlantic complicated inter-service squabbling on command , control (the aircraft belonged army; mission navy s; secretary of war stimson , general arnold refused release aircraft). later mitigated later in 1942 , 1943 assignment of navy-owned , operated pb4y-1 liberators, , late 1944, pb4y-2 privateer aircraft. although king had used allocation of ships european theatre leverage necessary resources pacific objectives, provided (at general marshall s request) additional month s production of landing craft support operation overlord. moreover, priority landing craft construction changed, factor outside king s remit. level of sea lift overlord turned out more adequate.

the employment of british , empire forces in pacific political matter. measure forced on churchill british chiefs of staff, not re-establish british presence in region, mitigate impression in u.s. british doing nothing defeat japan. king adamant naval operations against japan remain 100% american, , angrily resisted idea of british naval presence in pacific @ quadrant conference in late 1944, citing (among other things) difficulty of supplying additional naval forces in theatre (for same reason, hap arnold resisted offer of raf units in pacific). in addition, king (along marshall) had continually resisted operations assist british agenda in reclaiming or maintaining part of pre-war colonial holdings in pacific or eastern mediterranean. roosevelt, however, overruled him and, despite king s reservations, british pacific fleet accounted against japan in last months of war.

general hastings ismay, chief of staff winston churchill, described king as:

...tough nails , carried himself stiffly poker. blunt , stand-offish, point of rudeness. @ start, intolerant , suspicious of things british, royal navy; equally intolerant , suspicious of american army. war against japan problem had devoted study of lifetime, , resented idea of american resources being used other purpose destroy japanese. mistrusted churchill s powers of advocacy, , apprehensive wheedle president roosevelt neglecting war in pacific.

contrary british opinion, king strong believer in germany first strategy. however, natural aggression did not permit him leave resources idle in atlantic utilized in pacific, when doubtful when — if ever — british consent cross-channel operation . king once complained pacific deserved 30% of allied resources getting 15%. when, @ casablanca conference, accused field-marshal sir alan brooke of favoring pacific war, argument became heated. combative general joseph stilwell wrote: brooke got nasty, , king got , sore. king climbed on table @ brooke. god, mad. wished had socked him.

following japan s defeat @ battle of midway, king advocated (with roosevelt s tacit consent) invasion of guadalcanal. when general marshall resisted line of action (as command operation), king stated navy (and marines) carry out operation themselves, , instructed admiral nimitz proceed preliminary planning. king won argument, , invasion went ahead backing of joint chiefs. successful, , first time japanese lost ground during war. attention pacific theatre highly regarded australian war historians.

in spite of (or perhaps partly because of) fact 2 men did not along, combined influence of king , general douglas macarthur increased allocation of resources pacific war.

court-martial of charles b. mcvay iii

another controversy involving king role in later annulled court-martial of captain charles b. mcvay iii, commander of uss indianapolis, possibly retaliation being reprimanded mcvay s father earlier.